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Abstract
A protocol for quantum bit commitment is proposed. The protocol
is feasible with present technology and is secure against cheaters with
unlimited computing power as long as the sender does not have the
technology to store an EPR particle for an arbitrarily long period of
time. The protocol is very efficient, requiring only tens of particles.
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Quantum cryptography was initiated by the pioneering work of Wiesner
in late Sixties (his paper, however, was not published until 1983 [1]). Over
the past two decades, many applications of quantum cryptography have been
discovered [2],[3]. One of the most outstanding applications of quantum
cryptography is quantum bit commitment.
The interest in bit commitment is motivated by a recent trend in cryp-
tographic research to reduce or more preferably to eliminate the complexity
assumptions from the protocols. Many protocol problems that were previ-
ously solved subject to complexity assumptions are now being solved without
these assumptions. These breakthroughs demonstrate the weaknesses of the
unproven complexity assumptions. One way of eliminating the complexity
assumptions from a protocol is to build the protocol using a small set of rel-
atively simple primitives. The security of the protocol then entirely depends
on the security of its primitives. One of the most fundamental primitives is
the bit commitment. The extreme generality and usefulness of bit commit-
ment primitive has been demonstrated by several authors [4].
Let us briefly review the goal of the bit commitment protocol:
(1) Alice has a bit λ in mind to which she would like to be committed toward
Bob.
(2) Bob should not learn any information about λ before Alice opens up the
commitment.
(3) Alice should not be able to change the value of λ after the commitment.
In the past, several bit commitment protocols based on complexity as-
sumptions have been proposed. However, none of these protocols are safe
against cheaters with unlimited computing power. Bit commitment protocols
based on uncertainty principle have also been proposed[5] [6] [7]. However,
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all these protocols are insecure against EPR attack [8-11]. In this paper, we
describe a new and efficient quantum bit protocol which requires only tens of
EPR particles and is feasible with present technology. However, the present
protocol, similar to previous schemes, is not secure against a cheating Al-
ice who has the technology to store an EPR particle for an arbitrarily long
period of time.
Before proceeding, it is useful to review some elementary features of quan-
tum mechanics. We consider a pair of particles in the EPR entangled state
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉). After particles are spatially separated, the spin of
the first (second) particle ma1 (m
b
2) is measured along an arbitrary axis ~a (
~b),
with the z axis being along the direction of flight of particles. If the spin of
the first (second) particle is up, then ma1 = 1 (m
b
2 = 1), and if the spin of
the first (second) particle is down, then ma1 = −1 (mb2 = −1). The expected
value of the product of the spins of the particles is
EΦ(~a,~b) = 〈Φ | σa1σb2 |Φ〉 (1)
= cos θ1 cos θ2 + sinθ1 sin θ2 cos (φ1 + φ2) ,
where θ1(θ2) is the polar angle between ~a
(
~b
)
and the z axis, and φ1(φ2) is
the azimuthal angle between ~a
(
~b
)
and the x axis. Similarly for a pair of
particles in the EPR entangled state |Φ′〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉− |↓↓〉) ,
EΦ′(~a,~b) = 〈Φ′ | σa1σb2 |Φ′〉 (2)
= cos θ1 cos θ2 − sinθ1 sin θ2 cos (φ1 + φ2) .
For a pair of particles in the entangled state |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉+ i |↓↓〉) ,
EΨ(~a,~b) = 〈Ψ | σa1σb2 |Ψ〉 (3)
= cos θ1 cos θ2 + sinθ1 sin θ2 sin (φ1 + φ2) .
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Finally for a pair of particles in the entangled state |Ψ′〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉 − i |↓↓〉) ,
EΨ′(~a,~b) = 〈Ψ′ | σa1σb2 |Ψ′〉 (4)
= cos θ1 cos θ2 − sinθ1 sin θ2 sin (φ1 + φ2) .
For states | Φ〉, | Φ′〉, | Ψ〉, and | Ψ′〉, the probability that the product of the
spins of the two particles ma1m
b
2 is +1 or −1 is
p(ma1m
b
1 = 1) =
1 + E(~a,~b)
2
, (5)
p(ma1m
b
1 = −1) =
1− E(~a,~b)
2
.
With the above in mind, we now proceed to describe a quantum bit com-
mitment protocol based on EPR states. Alice and Bob initiate the following
steps:
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a security parameter n. They also agree that if
Alice wants to be committed to bit λ = 1, then she prepares a sequence of n
states, randomly chosen from |Φ〉 or |Φ′〉, and if she wants to be committed
to bit λ = 0, then she prepares a sequence of n states, randomly chosen from
|Ψ〉 or |Ψ′〉. They also agree on a security parameter n.
(2) Bob chooses a vector B = (θ1, θ
′
1, φ1, φ
′
1, . . . , θn, θ
′
n, φn, φ
′
n) such that θi, θ
′
i,
φi, and φ
′
i satisfy one of the following relations:
(1) θi = θ
′
i = 90
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 0
◦,
(2) θi = θ
′
i and φi + φ
′
i = 0
◦,
(3) θi + θ
′
i = 180
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 0
◦,
(4) θi = θ
′
i = 90
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 90
◦,
(5) θi = θ
′
i and φi + φ
′
i = 90
◦,
(6) θi + θ
′
i = 180
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 90
◦.
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Bob will measure the spin of the first (second) particle at polar angle θi(θ
′
i)
and azimuthal angel φi(φ
′
i). He keeps the vector B secret.
(4)
n
Do
i=1
Alice sends the ith EPR pair to Bob. Bob measures the spin of the
first particle, ma1, along axis ~a at polar (azimuthal) angle θi(φi) and spin of
the second particle, mb1, along axis
~b at polar (azimuthal) angle θ′i(φ
′
i). Bob
keeps the results of his measurements secret.
Note that Bob does not learn any information about the bit λ since if
Alice selects states |Φ〉 or |Φ′〉, then
p(ma1m
b
1 = 1) =
1
2

1 + EΦ(~a,~b)
2
+
1 + EΦ′(~a,~b)
2

 , (6)
=
1 + cosθ1cosθ2
2
,
p(ma1m
b
1 = −1) =
1− cosθ1cosθ2
2
,
and if she selects states |Ψ〉 or |Ψ′〉, then
p(ma1m
b
1 = 1) =
1 + cosθ1cosθ2
2
, (7)
p(ma1m
b
1 = −1) =
1− cosθ1cosθ2
2
.
Thus according to the standard rules of quantum mechanics, Bob does not
learn any information about Alice’s bit no matter along which axis he per-
forms his measurement.
We now consider the opening of the commitment. Alice and Bob initiate
the following steps:
(1) Alice reveals the bit λ to Bob [As previously stated, λ = 1 indicates that
Alice has chosen state |Φ〉, or |Φ′〉, and λ = 0 indicates that Alice has chosen
the state |Ψ〉 or |Ψ′〉].
(2) If λ = 1, then
n
DO
i=1
Bob checks that if the ith EPR state is | Φ〉, then
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m1am
2
b = 1 whenever θi = θ
′
i = 90
◦ and φi+φ
′
i = 0
◦, and whenever θi = θ
′
i and
φi+φ
′
i = 0
◦. If the ith EPR state is is |Φ′〉, then Bob checks thatm1am2b = −1
whenever θi = θ
′
i = 90
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 0
◦, and whenever θi + θ
′
i = 180
◦ and
φi + φ
′
i = 0
◦.
If λ = 0,
n
DO
i=1
Bob checks that if the ith EPR state is |Ψ〉, then m1am2b = 1
whenever θi = θ
′
i = 90
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 90
◦, and whenever θi = θ
′
i and
φi+φ
′
i = 90
◦. If the ith EPR state is is |Ψ′〉 then Bob checks thatm1am2b = −1
whenever θi = θ
′
i = 90
◦ and φi + φ
′
i = 90
◦, and whenever θi + θ
′
i = 180
◦ and
φi + φ
′
i = 90
◦.
(3) If these conditions are satisfied, then Bob accepts that Alice had indeed
committed to the bit λ.
We now show that the above bit commitment protocol is perfectly secure
against cheaters with unlimited computing power provided Alice does not
have the technology to store an EPR particle for an arbitrarily long period
of time. First we note that if Alice is honest, and if no transmission errors
occur [12], then condition (2) is always satisfied. Now suppose that a cheating
Alice tries to commit in a way that will enable her to change λ at a later
time. In order to achieve this, she must tell Bob that she had selected (for
example) state | Φ〉, when in reality she had committed to the state | Ψ〉.
Consider an instance when Bob measures the spin of the first particle along
axis ~a and the spin of the second particle along axis~b, and obtainsma1m
b
2 = 1.
If she cheats and tells Bob that she had used |Φ〉, then the probability that
her guess is correct is 1
2
. Therefore, in the long run, the probability that Alice
cheats and succeeds is
(
1
2
)n
2 [note that Bob uses approximately n2 particles
to reach a decision: When Alice tells Bob that she has committed to state
| Φ〉 or | Φ′〉, then Bob considers only instances when φi + φ′i = 0◦ which
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happens for approximately n2 particles. Similarly when Alice tells Bob that
she has committed to state |Ψ〉 or |Ψ′〉, then Bob considers only instances
when φi+φ
′
i = 90
◦ which again happens for approximately n2 particles]. For
sufficiently large security parameter n, the probability of success of a cheating
Alice can be made arbitrarily small.
We now show that the proposed protocol is not secure against EPR attack
(see also [8-11]), that is, we show that the protocol is not secure against
a cheating Alice who has the technology to store the third particle of the
following EPR state |A〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑↑〉+ |↓↓↓〉) for an arbitrarily long period
of time. We consider a spin variable at polar angle θ and at azimuthal angle
φ along direction ~n. The states of spin-up |↑〉 and spin-down |↓〉 can be
expanded in terms of the states of spin-up | +〉 and spin-down | −〉 along
direction ~n so that we have the expressions
|↑〉 = e(iφ/2) [cos (θ/2) |+〉 − sin (θ/2) |−〉] ,
|↓〉 = e(−iφ/2) [sin (θ/2) |+〉+ cos (θ/2) |−〉] . (8)
By expanding |↑〉 and |↓〉 in terms of | x〉 and | −x〉, we obtain
|↑〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉− |−x〉) ,
|↓〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉+ |−x〉) . (9)
Similarly by expanding |↑〉 and |↓〉 in terms of | y〉 and | −y〉, we obtain
|↑〉 = (1 + i)
2
(|y〉− |− y〉) ,
|↓〉 = (1− i)
2
(|y〉+ |− y〉) . (10)
Using Eqs. (9) and expanding the third particle of state |A〉 in terms of
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| x〉 and | −x〉, we obtain
|A〉 = 1
2
[|↑↑〉 (|x〉− |−x〉)] + 1
2
[|↓↓〉 (|x〉+ |−x〉)] . (11)
Rearranging the terms,
|A〉 = 1√
2
[|φ〉 |x〉− |φ′〉 |−x〉] . (12)
Similarly by expanding the third particle of state |A〉 in terms the | y〉 and
|− y〉, we obtain
|A〉 = 1 + i
2
[|ψ′〉 |y〉− |ψ〉 |− y〉] . (13)
Now if Alice wants to pretend that she had committed to bit 0, that is, if she
wants to pretend she had chosen states |Φ〉 or |Φ′〉, then she measures the
spin of the third particle along the x axis. If the result of her measurement is
1 (−1), then she tells Bob that she had chosen state |Φ〉 (|Φ′〉). Similarly if
Alice wants to pretend that she had committed to bit 1, that is, if she wants
to pretend that she had chosen states |Ψ〉 or |Ψ′〉, then she measures the
spin of the third particle along the y axis. If the result of her measurement
is 1 (−1), then she tells Bob that she had chosen state |Ψ′〉 (|Ψ〉).
In summary, we have shown that the present protocol is secure even
against cheaters with unlimited computing power, However, the proposed
scheme is not secure against a cheating Alice who has the technology to
store an EPR particle for an arbitrarily long period of time.
I am grateful to H. K. Lo for helpful discussions. I also thank D. Mayers
for sending me his unpublished results on the insecurity of all bit commitment
protocols.
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